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Collateral  is  one  of  the  most  important  features  of  a  debt  contract.  A  substantial 
theoretical literature motivates the use of collateral as a means to alleviate ex-ante and 
ex-post information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and the incidence of 
credit rationing. Through its seniority effect, collateral may also affect banks’ incentives 
to  monitor  borrowers.  There  is  little  empirical  evidence,  however,  on  the  precise 
workings of collateral, its interaction with other contract terms, and its impact on banks’ 
monitoring incentives.  
We  study  a  change  in  the  Swedish  law  that  exogenously  reduced  the  value  of  all 
outstanding  company  mortgages,  i.e.,  a  type  of  collateral  that  is  comparable  to  the 
floating lien. We explore this natural experiment to identify how collateral determines 
borrower quality, loan terms, access to credit and bank monitoring of business term 
loans. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we find that following the change in 
the law and the loss in collateral value borrowers pay a higher interest rate on their 
loans, receive a worse quality assessment by their bank, and experience a substantial 
reduction in the supply of credit by their bank. Consistent with theories that consider 
collateral  and  monitoring  to  be  complements,  the  reduction  in  collateral  precedes  a 
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 1.  Introduction  
Collateral is one of the most important features of many debt contracts. An extensive 
theoretical  literature  motivates  the  use  of  collateral  to  ameliorate  information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. Specifically, collateral is perceived to be a 
costly, yet effective loan-contracting tool aimed at alleviating  ex ante adverse selection 
and  ex post moral hazard problems (Bester (1985); Chan and Thakor (1987); Boot et al. 
(1991);  Boot  and  Thakor  (1994)).  Consequently,  posting  collateral  can  relax  credit 
constraints. 
From the lender’s perspective, collateral (that is internal) generally grants a higher 
position on the seniority ladder and therefore reduces the lender’s expected losses given 
default. Recent research shows that collateral may thereby affect the incentives of banks 
to seek information about their prospective and current borrowers (Berglöf and von 
Thadden (1994); Rajan and Winton (1995); Repullo and Suarez (1998); Longhofer and 
Santos (2000); Manove et al. (2001); Gorton and Kahn (2000)). The ability of banks to 
produce  information  about  borrowers  forms  the  centerpiece  in  modern  theory  of 
financial  intermediation  (Diamond  (1984)).  To  the  extent  that  both  monitoring  and 
collateral  serve  the  purpose  of  reducing  the  information  gap  between  borrower  and 
lender, it is also important to understand their interplay. 
Despite the abundance in theoretical modeling, the precise workings of collateral, 
such as its interaction with other contract terms and its impact on a bank’s monitoring 
incentives and credit availability, have yet to be identified empirically in a convincing 
way.  Many  of  the  difficulties  faced  by  existing  empirical  studies  reside  in  the 
limitations  of  the  available  data  and  the  resulting  econometric  challenges. Accurate 
information  on  collateral  value  and  monitoring  activity  is  typically  not  available  to 
researchers. Moreover, the joint determination of collateral with other contract terms 2 
 
(Dennis et al. (2000); Brick and Palia (2007); Bharath et al. (2007)) and with bank 
monitoring effort (Ono and Uesugi (2009)) requires that several strong and potentially 
questionable assumptions need to be made in order to identify the effects of collateral. 
In this paper, we aim to take a step forward in identifying the role that collateral 
plays in debt contracts and its impact on credit availability and bank monitoring. For 
this purpose, we exploit a change in law implemented in Sweden on January 1
st, 2004 
that reduced the value of company mortgages, a special collateral right commonly used 
in Sweden. Company mortgage refers to a claim on a floating pool of assets that, in 
many aspects, resembles the also widely observed floating lien in the U.S., the floating 
charge  in  the  U.K.,  and  the  chattel  mortgage  in  Australia.  This  unique  natural 
experiment enables us to isolate unambiguously the impact that collateral has on the 
loan rate, the borrower-specific credit supply, the bank’s internal measure of borrower 
risk, and its monitoring behavior. 
Our empirical strategy combines two key ingredients that enable us to overcome the 
econometric difficulties faced in the extant literature. The first ingredient is a unique 
experimental setting that exogenously reduced the value of a special and widely used 
type of collateral. The second ingredient is a rich dataset from a major Swedish bank 
that contains all the records it keeps on file about its entire portfolio of business term-
loan contracts, including the loan rate, lending limit, a bank-internal borrower rating, 
monitoring activity, and regularly updated estimates of the value of the assets pledged 
to secure each loan. 
We study the effects of the change in law using a differences-in-differences method. 
Specifically, we assign the 3,537 loans, that are observed during 108,368 loan-months 
in our sample, to an affected, i.e., treated, and a non-treated group. Treated loans are 
those  for  which  the  borrower  pledged  the  bank  a  company  mortgage  that  is  still 3 
 
outstanding around the change in the law. Importantly for our purposes, we are able to 
identify the causal relationship from collateral to interest rates because all business term 
loans carry a quarterly adjustable interest rate while all other contract terms are fixed. 
We establish four main findings, which we obtain comparing the same treated loans 
and borrowers before and after the change in law. First, following the change in the law, 
the  bank  reduces  the  assessed  value  of  the  outstanding  collateral.  For  example,  the 
collateral coverage ratio recorded by the bank drops by 4 percentage points on average 
following the change in the law. Second, the bank reduces its internal credit limit to 
borrowers  with  collateralized  business  loans  by  13  percent  and  downgrades  these 
borrowers  by  almost  2  notches  on  a  21-grade  scale.  Third,  the  bank  increases  the 
interest rate on the same treated loan by 24 basis points. Even after controlling for the 
reassessment  of  borrower  quality  by  the  bank,  the  increase  in  the  loan  rate  is 
approximately 20 basis points (which,  recall from the first finding, corresponds to a 4 
percentage point decline in the collateral coverage ratio). Fourth, following the change 
in the law, the bank significantly reduces the intensity and frequency of its monitoring 
of the condition of both the collateral and the borrower. 
Taken together, these results suggest that collateral is important for the bank and 
valuable for the borrower. Following a loss in collateral value, the bank charges a higher 
interest  rate  on  the  loan,  decreases  the  availability  of  credit,  worsens  its  quality 
assessment of the borrower, and reduces its monitoring efforts of collateral as well as of 
the borrower. Overall, our findings are consistent with Berger et al. (2010), who – even 
though they do not study the effect of collateral on loan pricing and credit availability − 
document that collateral serves primarily as a contractual device to solve moral hazard 
problems.  Our  evidence  also  suggests  collateral  may  complement  monitoring.  This 4 
 
finding is in line with Rajan and Winton (1995), who claim that collateral can improve 
lenders' incentives to monitor when the value of the assets pledged is risky. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates  our paper 
further to the literature. Section 3 describes the change in the company mortgage law. 
Section 4 details the data, variables, and empirical methodology. Section 5 discusses the 
impact  of  the  change  in  the  law  on  collateralization,  loan  rate,  borrower  limit  and 
internal rating, and bank monitoring effort. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Literature Review 
a.  Collateral and Loan Contracting 
An  extensive  theoretical  literature  emphasizes  the  role  of  collateral  as  an 
effective loan-contracting tool aimed at ameliorating information asymmetries in the 
credit market.
1 Collateral may compensate either for  ex ante adverse selection (e.g., 
Bester (1985); Chan and Thakor (1987); Boot et al. (1991)) or for ex post moral hazard 
problems (Boot and Thakor (1994)). The two sets of theories offer opposite predictions 
regarding the relation between the incidence of collateral and the observable quality of 
the borrower. While ex post theories predict that riskier borrowers are more likely to be 
required  to  pledge  collateral,  ex  ante  theories  postulate  that  unobservably  safer 
borrowers pledge collateral. Not surprisingly, the empirical evidence is equally mixed 
with this respect. Overall, the available evidence seems to suggest that riskier borrowers 
are more likely to pledge collateral (e.g., Berger and Udell (1990); Berger and Udell 
(1995); Harhoff and Körting (1998); Berger et al. (2010)). 
                                                 
1 Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Degryse et al. (2009) review the theory and the empirical evidence 
on collateral and bank-firm relationships. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
model the role of collateral for macro-economic credit cycles. Liberti and Mian (2010) document the 
importance of collateral for economic development. 5 
 
A related empirical question that has received much attention recently is the relation 
between collateral and loan rates. This is a challenging empirical question, since loan 
contract terms may be determined simultaneously (as was already recognized by Melnik 
and Plaut (1986) for example). Some studies have attempted to address this concern by 
estimating models  of simultaneous  equations  (Dennis  et  al. (2000); Brick and Palia 
(2007);  Bharath  et  al.  (2007)).  Specifically,  these  studies  employ  an  instrumental 
variables  approach  to  estimate  the  effect  on  the  loan  rate  of  a  binary  measure  of 
collateral, assuming that the relationship between the two variables is unidirectional. 
Although  they  employ  different  U.S.  datasets,  all  three  studies  find  a  positive  and 
statistically  significant  effect  of  the  collateral  dummy  on  the  loan  rate,  which  they 
interpret in light of ex ante collateral theories. 
b.  Collateral and Bank Monitoring 
While collateral is often regarded as a contractual device to mitigate a borrower’s 
adverse incentives, a recent literature deals with the agency problems on the lender’s 
side. From the lender’s perspective, collateral grants a higher position on the seniority 
ladder and therefore reduces the lender’s expected losses given a borrower’s default. 
A  substantial  literature  demonstrates  that  seniority  improves  a  lender’s 
incentives to monitor the firm and liquidate the firm if it gets in financial distress (e.g., 
Berglöf and von Thadden (1994); Repullo and Suarez (1998); Gorton and Kahn (2000); 
Park (2000)). Longhofer and Santos (2000) for example show that seniority encourages 
the formation of banking relationships and thereby improves the banks’ incentives to 
monitor. The intuition for their result is that in bad states the investment in monitoring 
yields higher returns when the lender is senior. In Park (2000), seniority ensures that the 
lender appropriates the full return from monitoring when the borrower's moral hazard 
problem  is  severe.  Rajan  and  Winton  (1995),  on  the  other  hand,  argue  that  in  the 6 
 
presence  of  other  claimants  monitoring  is  valuable  because  it  allows  the  lender  to 
demand  additional collateral  if the firm  is  in  distress.  As a  result, collateral  should 
improve a bank’s monitoring incentives.
2 
To the best of our knowledge,  Ono and Uesugi (2009) is the only  other empirical 
study that attempts to test the relation between collateral and monitoring. Using a 
survey dataset of Japanese small and medium enterprises, Ono and Uesugi (2009) find 
that firms that more frequently  submit documents to their main bank are less likely to 
pledge collateral.
3 
We aim to take a ste p forward in identifying the value of collateralization  and its 
impact on borrower quality and bank monitoring . To this end, we  exploit a change in 
the law affecting the value of collateral as  a unique natural experiment and employ a 
differences-in-differences approach  to analyze a dataset containing all business term 
loans granted by a major Swedish bank. Our empirical analysis in this way combines  a 
unique experimental setting and a comprehensive dataset to overcome the fundamental 
econometric identification challenge that existing studies have partly left unaddressed. 
3.  The Swedish Company Mortgage 
The company mortgage is a special type of collateral commonly used in Sweden that 
in many aspects resembles the floating lien in the United States, the floating charge in 
the U.K., and the chattel mortgage in Australia.
4 Many other jurisdictions recognize 
                                                 
2  Manove  et  al.  (2001)  argue  that  collateral  can  weaken  the  bank’s  incentive  to  evaluate  the 
profitability  of  a  planned  investment  project.  We  note  that  while  their  model  focuses  on  screening 
incentives, the focus of our empirical investigation is bank monitoring. 
3 Ono and Uesugi (2009) measure the incidence of collateral with an indicator variable . About 72 
percent of the firms in their sample responded that they pledged collateral to their main  bank. They 
measure monitoring with an ordinal variable that ranges from one (documents submitted to the borrower 
once every 1-2 months) to four (documents submitted on an annual basis). In a related study,  Argentiero 
(2009)  employs data from Italy to analyze the relation between collateral value and firm screening, 
measured as the number of bank employees in the lending branch scaled by the loan amount. 
4 In the United States, a lien  typically refers to so called non-possessory collateral interests. In many 
other common-law countries, liens tend to refer to possessory collateral. A  chattel pledge typically refers 7 
 
comparable  collateral  concepts.  Company  mortgages  and  their  equivalents  in  other 
jurisdictions have been popular as collateral for two main reasons. First, chargees create 
collateral  that covers  not  only  current  but  also  future assets  in  a pre-defined range. 
Second,  chargors  can,  to  the  extent  possible,  extract  contractual  benefits  from  their 
lenders with the pledged assets while maintaining their freedom to use the assets in the 
normal  course  of  their  business  and  thus  avoiding  the  inconvenience  of  requiring 
permission  from  their  lenders  to  engage  in  transactions.  Floating  charges  provide 
creditors with seniority, but rank behind holders of fixed collateral and claims by some 
classes of preferential creditors however. 
Swedish  company mortgages  enable businesses to  pledge particular categories of 
personal  assets  as  collateral,  with  the  exception  of  assets  that  can  be  mortgaged 
otherwise such as real estate and financial assets, i.e., cash, bank deposits, stocks, and 
bonds. Each mortgage is recorded in an official register maintained by the Swedish 
Companies Registration Office. The holder of a company mortgage can voluntarily list 
himself  in  the  register.  Registering  a  company  mortgage  does  not  guarantee  that 
nominally sufficient collateral is present in the business. For example, the registration 
office does not have any responsibility to verify coverage. If a business has registered 
multiple  company  mortgages,  these  mortgages  have  relative  seniority  ordering 
depending  on  the  calendar  date  of  their  registration.  Businesses  pay  a  one  percent 
annual  register  fee  over  the  outstanding  amount  of  the  company  mortgage  plus  a 
nominal fee upfront. 
Before 2004, company mortgages were special priority rights claims that could be 
invoked by its holder not only in case of a bankruptcy – as is the case with any normal, 
                                                                                                                                               
to a security concept where the chattel is brought under the control of the creditor, for example through an 
approved third-party warehouse. Berger and Udell (2006) report that in 2003 the stock of total asset-based 
loans in the U.S. was about $300 billion, compared to a stock of commercial and industrial loans of about 
$900 billion (inclusive of bank asset-based loans). 8 
 
not legally prioritized claim, as well as with many senior debt claims – but also in the 
case of distraint, i.e., the seizure of assets by a third party. This special priority right 
raised the value of the company mortgage versus claims that had: (1) Normal priority 
rights, and hence are ranked below special priority rights, such as costs incurred in 
bankruptcy  or  reconstruction  procedures,  taxes  and  most  of  the  wage  claims  by 
employees (a limited part has special priority rights); or (2) no priority rights. 
On January 1
st, 2004, the Law on Company Mortgages that regulates the company 
mortgage  (henceforth,  “the  Law”)  was  changed.
5  The  special priority rights of the 
company mortgage converted into normal priority rights and consequently the security 
interest obtained by means of a company mortgage could only be invoked in the case of 
bankruptcy. While the group of assets that could be pooled into a company mortgage 
now also included cash, bank deposits, financial assets, and real estate, the share of total 
eligible assets was reduced from 100% to 55%.
6 As a result, the company mortgage lost 
in value in most cases. In fact, the official records of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Civil Law  mention that collateral of lower quality will provide better incentives to 
banks to assess the profitability of firms rather than the availability of collateral. 
Yet, lawmakers did not expect the change in law to result in higher  collateralization 
requirements because these requirements were supposedly at their maximum already.
7 
The Swedish Banking Association, however, commented on the proposed change in the 
law that it expected collateralization requirements to increase, given the key role played 
                                                 
5 The “Lag (2003:528) om företagsinteckning” replaced the ”Lag (1984:649) om företagshypotek”. 
6 Other elements of the change in the law were an abolishment of the normal priority rights of the 
taxes (to give government institutions incentives to cooperate in bankruptcies and reconstructions) and a 
quantitative reduction of the normal priority rights of wage claims. To compensate for the latter reduction, 
the government increased the wage amount it guaranteed with public funds. 
7 Lawmakers also did not expect any detrimental effects  of the change in the law on  start-up firms 
because primarily more mature businesses in their expansionary phase employ the company mortgage 
(Source: Official Documents of the Parliamentary Committee on Civil Law dealing with the change in the 
law, Sveriges Riksdag, Lagutskottets betänkande 2002/03:LU17). 9 
 
by collateral for Basel II capital requirements. The Association also expected interest 
rate margins to increase. 
In principle, the change in the law mainly aimed at improving the possibilities for 
temporally troubled but essentially solvent and viable businesses to avoid inefficient 
liquidation by timely reorganization, and at weakening the lenders’ incentives to secure 
collateral rather than to spend effort screening and monitoring the borrowers. However, 
while abolishing the special priority rights of the company mortgage meant that changes 
in the composition of assets (during borrower distress for example) would matter less 
for lenders (by abating the borrowers’ incentives to game the assets and assuring lenders 
their collateral value), any lenders’ collateral claim would now require the borrower’s 
actual bankruptcy.
8 
Given the nearly experimental setting this change in the law provides, involving an 
exogenous and rather sudden loss in the value o f all company mortgages, we study its 
impact on all outstanding loans and a  bank’s collateralization requirements, loan rates 
and monitoring intensity. 
                                                 
8 The 2004 change in the law was mostly “reversed” on January 1
st, 2009. Currently lacking the 
required data, we leave the study of this reversal for future research. Among the economic arguments put 
forward by the government for this reversal were anecdotic reports that companies found it more difficult 
to obtain credit, and that credit had become more expensive, especially in the less densely populated areas 
of Sweden. Many governmental agencies, industry lobbies and legal specialists on the other hand in their 
solicited written comments on the proposed reversal argued in vain that too little time had passed for a 
serious  evaluation  of  the  2004  change  in  the  law.  The  government  pushed  the  reversal  arguing  that 
businesses  would  have  more  assets  available  as  collateral  and  thus  better  access  to  credit.  Worse 
incentives for lenders to monitor and for borrowers during bankruptcy received only short shrift this time. 
In fact, the government explicitly expected bankruptcy to become more likely and reorganization less 
likely. The 2009 change in the law did not only involve a reversal of the 2004 change as it also totally 
abolished the government’s normal priority rights for paid-out guarantees on wage claims. A budget 
proposal to cover the expected reduction in government revenues in bankruptcy procedures, amounting to 
298 million Swedish kroner (about 38 million U.S. dollars in 2009) per year therefore accompanied the 
change in the law. 10 
 
4.  Data, Variables, and Empirical Methodology 
a.  Data 
For  our  analysis,  we  use  a  unique  and  comprehensive  database  containing  all 
corporate accounts of a major Swedish commercial bank (henceforth, “the bank”). The 
database  contains  all  loan  files  the  bank  maintains  for  each  borrower  at  a  monthly 
frequency between 2003:01 and 2006:12. From this database, we extract all business 
term loans, i.e., loans with a pre-determined quarterly repayment schedule. Important 
for our purposes, business term loans can be either secured or unsecured by a company 
mortgage. Company mortgages can only be pledged to secure this particular type of 
loan.
9 The loans carry a floating reference interest rate with a mark-up that is adjustable 
on a quarterly basis. For our purposes, it is important that no other contract feature than 
the interest rate paid on the loan can be altered in respons e to a change in collateral 
values. 
We supplement the bank ’s  data  with  information  from  the  Swedish  Companies 
Registration  Office.  The  Office  maintains  registered  information  on  all  company 
mortgages  pledged  in  Sweden.  The  dataset  we  have  access  to  tracks  all  company 
mortgages registered between 2000 and 2008. For each company mortgage, we obtain 
the date of registration and the amount. The identity of the holder of the mortgage letter 
is not always known because this information is not required by the Office. However, 
the holder often provides his identity voluntarily when filing the company mortgage, 
because it allows for notification when collateral becomes callable. 
                                                 
9 The internal classification of loans by the bank is such that loans with a variety of fixed collateral 
make up a range of separate loan categories. Similarly, unsecured credit is also identified separately. 11 
 
b.  Variables 
Table  1  describes  the  dependent  variables  used  in  this  study  and  presents  some 
descriptive statistics for each variable: The mean, standard deviation, and number of 
observations. We analyze three sets of variables. First, we analyze some terms specified 
in each individual loan contract: The collateral value, the collateral coverage ratio, and 
the loan rate. The collateral value is the bank’s own estimate of the assets pledged to 
secure that particular loan. The collateral value is updated occasionally as a result of the 
bank’s revaluation of the assets pledged. On average, businesses pledge € 49,950 worth 
of assets through a company mortgage. The collateral coverage ratio is defined as the 
collateral value scaled by the exposure (i.e., the outstanding balance) of the loan and 
equals 46.6 percent on average. The coverage ratio is an important determinant of the 
lender’s recovery rate upon a loan default (Khieu and Mullineaux (2009); Altman and 
Kalotay (2010)). The average loan rate, computed as the annualized interest rate of the 
loan, equals 6.57 percent. 
Second, we employ two measures of the bank’s own assessment of the borrower’s 
creditworthiness. The first is the internal credit rating of the borrower, which ranges 
from 0 (highest risk category) to 20 (lowest risk category), with a mean of 9.28. Only 
borrowers  with  exposure  levels  above  a  certain  threshold  are  assigned  an  internal 
rating.
10 To circumvent the problem that these ratings are missing for almost 40% of the 
borrowers in our sample, we  first analyze the borrower’s internal credit limit, i.e., the 
maximum exposure the bank is willing to have vis-à-vis each client. As with the internal 
ratings,  this  internal  limit  is  reviewed  periodically  and  is  generally  not  directly 
observable by the borrower. In most cases, the borrower’s total exposure is a fraction of 
                                                 
10 For confidentiality reasons, we cannot disclose what the threshold is. Clients with an exposure 
below this threshold are assigned a so-called “behavioral rating” which is based on account behavior. We 
do not have access to the behavioral ratings. Evidence on the importance of indications from account 
activity for loan pricing is provided by Norden and Weber (2010). 12 
 
this  internal  limit.  However,  in  some  cases  the  internal  limit  equals  the  borrower’s 
current exposure. Borrowers have an average internal credit limit of € 499,000. 
Third, we propose a number of measures of bank monitoring activity. We separate 
these  measures  into  collateral-based  and  borrower-based  measures.  Collateral-based 
monitoring relates to the revaluation of the assets pledged as collateral, while borrower-
based monitoring pertains to the review by the bank of the borrower’s condition. In the 
context  of  collateral-based  monitoring,  we  further  distinguish  between  monitoring 
intensity and monitoring frequency. We measure monitoring intensity as the absolute 
value of the percentage change in the collateral value between two consecutive months. 
The mean annualized change in collateral value equals 6.05 percent. We presume that 
larger  asset  revaluations  require  more  time  spent  by  loan  officers  in  evaluating  the 
assets  pledged  as  collateral.  While  some  infrequent  additions  or  subtractions  of 
collateral could also result in large changes in collateral value, we note that they may 
also be the consequence of loan officer monitoring and actions. 
We also analyze the magnitude of changes in  the collateral coverage ratio as an 
alternative  measure  of  collateral  monitoring  intensity.  If  the  bank’s  monitoring 
incentives of a particular loan are tied to its risk exposure, then monitoring incentives 
should be tied to the coverage ratio, rather than to the absolute collateral value. The 
mean change in the collateral coverage ratio is 2.9 percent. 
Besides  considering  the  magnitude  of  the  revaluations  of  the  assets  pledged  as 
collateral,  we  also  analyze  the  frequency  with  which  loan  officers  undertake  such 
revaluations. To this end, we calculate the number of collateral revaluations made per 
year. As before, we compute this measure for both the collateral value and the collateral 
coverage  ratio.  The  average  number  of  revaluations  ranges  between  2  and  2.3, 
depending on the measure chosen. 13 
 
Finally, we compute a measure of borrower monitoring based on the frequency with 
which the bank revises the client’s situation. Specifically, we calculate the time to the 
next review as the number of months until the next planned review date. The time to the 
next revision is slightly above 10 months but varies widely across firms. The revision 
outcome may be a change in the collateral value, the loan rate, the internal limit, and/or 
the internal rating. The revision of the client’s situation requires that the loan officer 
collects and processes new information about the customer. This leads us to hypothesize 
that more frequent revisions are consistent with a more intensive monitoring effort. 
c.  Empirical Methodology 
We examine the effects of the change in the law using a differences-in-differences 
approach.  This  methodology  compares  the  effect  of  the  change  in  the  law  on  two 
groups: A group that is affected by the event, which we will call “the treated group”, 
and a group that is unaffected by the event, which is the control group or non-treated 
group. The differences-in-differences approach then relies on measuring the differential 
effect of the change in the law across the two groups. 
Our identification strategy exploits the change in the law in 2004 that decreased the 
value of company mortgages. We define the treated group as all borrowers that pledged 
a company mortgage to the bank before 2004.
11 Since the change in law focused only 
on this particular type of collateral, we presume that  borrowers that never registered a 
company mortgage during our sample period should not have been directly affected by 
the new law. Therefore, we assign these borrowers to the non-treated group. We further 
require that the non-treated borrowers have loans outstanding that originate prior to the 
change in the law and mature thereafter (relaxing this requirement by including all loans 
                                                 
11 Recall that the company mortgages dataset we obtain from the Swedish Companies Registration 
Office starts in 2000. 14 
 
that are outstanding during the sample period does not alter results). Borrowers that 
pledged a company mortgage either to any other identified entity or to an unidentified 
entity were dropped. 
To evaluate the effect of the change in law, we estimate the following regression 
model: 
                                      
     (1) 
where i indexes loans or borrowers (depending on the specification),
12 and t indexes 
time, i.e., year*month. The dependent variable is yit and the error term is uit. 
The  main  explanatory  variable  of  interest,  Treatedi  ftert,  results  from  the 
interaction of two terms.
13 The first, Treatedi, defines the treated group (as opposed to 
the  non-treated  group).  Specifically,  this  dummy  indicates  whether  the  firm  had  a 
company  mortgage  pledged  to  our  bank  before  the  new  law  became  effective  on 
January 1
st, 2004. This variable captures differences between the treated and non-treated 
groups before the change in the law. 
The second term,  ftert, equals one for the periods following the change in the law 
(i.e.,  2004:01  to  2006:12),  and  equals  zero  otherwise  (2003:01  to  2003:12).  This 
variable captures differences for the non-treated group before and after the change in 
law.  To  the  extent  that  the  change  was  anticipated,  and  loan  contracts  and  bank 
assessments  were  adjusted  prior  the  effective  implementation  date,  we  are  likely  to 
underestimate  the  impact  of  the  change  in  the  law.  Nevertheless,  in  unreported 
robustness checks we confirm this to be only marginally the case. 
                                                 
12 Some firms have more than one loan at the bank so we can use the loan as a cross-sectional unit. 
We then cluster the standard errors at the borrower level to address the potential correlation between 
loans belonging to the same borrower (Bertrand et al. (2004)). 
13 We cannot include the two variables separately in the specification, because  Treated is spanned by 
the individual fixed effects, while After is spanned by the time fixed effects. 15 
 
The variable resulting from interacting the two terms, Treatedi  ftert, measures the 
differences-in-differences effect. Specifically, it measures the differential effect of the 
change in the law across firms that had pledged and firms that had not pledged company 
mortgages. 
The model includes both individual fixed effects ( i) and time fixed effects ( t). The 
inclusion of these fixed effects is crucial to absorb sources of heterogeneity. On the one 
hand,  the  individual  fixed  effects  control  for  time-invariant  differences  between  the 
treated and non-treated groups. This ensures that our estimates are not plagued by bias 
due to nonrandom selection into treatment (i.e., a firm’s decision to pledge a company 
mortgage on a particular loan). On the other hand, the time fixed effects control for 
aggregate fluctuations at the singular bank level. 
5.  The Impact of the Change in the Law  
a.  Collateralization, Loan Rate, Borrower Limit and Internal Rating 
We start by documenting the effect of the change in law on the borrowers’ credit 
terms.  Specifically,  we  analyze  how  the  exogenous  decrease  in  collateral  value 
following the 2004 change in the law affects the loans’ collateral value and coverage 
ratios,  interest  rate,  as  well  as  the  borrowers’  internal  limits  and  ratings.  Table  2 
displays the averages for the non-treated and treated groups, before and after the change 
in law, for the five aforementioned variables. The table also provides differences of 
means tests and differences-in-differences estimates. We note that the estimates of these 
differences can also be obtained by estimating the pooled version of equation (1), where 
the individual effects ( i) and time effects ( t) are replaced by the          and        
variables,  respectively.  Therefore,  when  interpreting  the  differences-in-differences 16 
 
estimates displayed in Table 2, one should keep in mind that they do not account for 
unobserved heterogeneity across loans, firms, and time. 
Before the change in the law, borrowers that had pledged company mortgages had 
credit terms that were virtually identical to those of borrowers in the non-treated group. 
We note that the only difference between the two groups is that the treated borrowers 
had significantly lower internal ratings. 
The differences in means before and after the change in law are difficult to interpret 
because they are probably capturing economy or bank wide changes that affect both 
groups. Most interesting is the finding that the 2004 change in the law brought about a 
significant  wedge between the two  groups.  Specifically,  borrowers  with outstanding 
pledged  company  mortgages  experienced  a  sharp  decrease  in  collateral  value,  a 
significant increase in the loan rate, and deterioration in their internal limits. 
To further assess the significance of the change in law, we rely on the differences-in-
differences estimates shown in Table 3. These estimates are obtained from the model in 
equation (1), which includes sets of fixed effects for both the cross-sectional (i.e., loans 
or borrowers) and time (i.e., year*month) units. The results indicate that the value of the 
assets pledged as collateral by the treated group decreased by 75% on average. Part of 
this effect is due to a larger reduction in outstanding loan amount for the treated group. 
However, the decrease in collateral value is sharper than the decrease in the individual 
loan exposure for the treated group, which translates into a decline in their collateral 
coverage  ratio  of  more  than  four  percentage  points  after  2004.  Hence,  and  not 
unexpectedly, the change in the law is perceived by the bank to result in a loss of 
collateral value. 
The  decrease  in  the  coverage  ratio  caused  by  the  reduction  in  the  value  of 
outstanding collateral increases the bank’s expected losses. Consistent with this view, 17 
 
the treated group also experienced an average 24 basis points increase in their loan rate, 
a reduction in their internal credit limit by 13 percent and a downgrade in their internal 
rating by almost 2 levels on a 21-level scale, vis-à-vis the untreated group. 
Following  the  change  in  the  law,  we  observe  a  contemporaneous  decline  in  the 
collateral coverage ratio of about 4 percentage points and an increase in the loan rate by 
24 basis points, for the same loan and borrower. However, the change in the value of the 
company  mortgage  also  affects  the  borrower  limit  and  the  rating.  In  Table  4  we 
introduce these internal bank measures of borrower risk as additional control variables 
in specifications for the 3,491 and 2,083 loans, respectively, for which we have these 
measures. Controlling for the deterioration in borrower quality ─ as assessed by the 
bank ─ slightly lowers the increase in the loan rate after the change in the law, but the 
impact  remains  statistically  significant  and  economically  relevant  (the  estimated 
coefficients on Treatedi  ftert “drop” from 19 to 18 and from 39 to 33 basis points, 
respectively). 
These estimates suggest that for the same loan contract (and accounting for changes 
in borrower quality following the change in the law) the bank “charges” the borrower on 
average around 6 basis points for each percentage point decrease in collateral coverage 
ratio.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  observation  that  collateralization  (and  the 
degree of subordination) is a key determinant of recovery on defaulted debt (e.g., Khieu 
and Mullineaux (2009); Altman and Kalotay (2010)). Consequently, our results suggest 
that  posting  collateral  may  substantially  reduce  the  loan  rate  at  the  individual  loan 
contract level. 
b.  Unaffected Leasing Contracts 
In order to test the robustness of our identification strategy, we propose a simple 
“placebo” test. Specifically, we investigate whether the change in the law has an impact 18 
 
on other loans in our sample that should not have been directly affected. We select all 
borrowers  in  our  sample  that  have  leasing  contracts  outstanding  in  2004.  Leasing 
contracts should not be affected by the change in the law, since a leased asset, and not a 
company mortgage, serves as its security. As a result, the change in the law should not 
have a differential effect on the loan rates charged to the leasing contracts of the non-
treated control and the treated groups. 
We  estimate this  premise using the  differences-in-differences model presented  in 
equation (1), which includes both loan and year*month fixed effects. The estimates (not 
reported) corroborate our empirical strategy, as the differences-in-differences estimate is 
statistically insignificant and economically negligible.
14 
c.  Bank Monitoring 
We  analyze  how  the  change  in  a  law,  which  weakened  the  value  of  company 
mortgages,  affected  the  bank’s  monitoring  activities.  We  analyze  the  effect  of  the 
change in law on the frequency and intensity of the loan officer’s revaluation of the 
assets pledged as collateral and on the frequency of review of the borrower’s condition. 
Table 5 provides the comparison of the means for the non-treated control and treated 
groups, before and after the 2004 change in the law, for our monitoring variables. As 
before,  we  prefer  to  assess  the  economic  effect  of  the  change  in  the  law  from  a 
specification that controls simultaneously for individual- and time- heterogeneity. Table 
6 displays the results of the full model. 
The  estimates  in  Table  6  show  that  following  the  2004  change  in  the  law  that 
reduced the collateral value of company mortgages, the bank monitored this collateral 
                                                 
14 We do find, however, a differential increase in the exposure of these lease contracts for the treated 
group following the change in law. The decrease in the value of the company mortgages may have pushed 
some firms to obtain financing through lease agreements. This result corroborates the view that a lease 
contract is often considered to be a potential substitute for a secured loan (Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009)). 19 
 
less actively than other types of collateral. This conclusion holds for the two measures 
of monitoring proposed – frequency and intensity, and regardless of whether we look at 
collateral value or at the collateral coverage ratio.
15 On the one hand, the change in the 
law led to a stronger reduction in the intensity of the revaluation of collateral for the 
treated group than for the control group. The estimated differences-in-differences effect 
suggests that the change in  the law decreased the magnitude of collateral revaluations 
by 2.5 percentage points. 
On the  other  hand, we observe that  the change  in  the  law  was followed by a 
significant  decrease  in  the  frequency  of  the  revaluation  of  the  assets  pledged  as 
collateral.  Moreover,  the  estimated   differential  decrease  in  the  frequency  of  0. 64 
revaluations  per  year  is  economically  meaningful,  since  the  average  number  of 
collateral revaluations per year in our sample is 2.02 (Table 1).  
Next, we turn to the effect of the change in law on the bank’s monitoring frequency 
of the borrower’s condition. The relevant model estimates are shown in the last column 
of Table 6. After the change in the law, the bank revised less frequently the condition of 
clients that had pledged company mortgages before 2004 than of clients who had not. 
On  average,  the  bank  revises  a  client’s  condition  approximately  every  ten  months 
(Table 1). Our  differences-in-differences  estimates  indicate that after 2004 the bank 
increased the revision interval by about three weeks for the treated group, as opposed to 
the control group. This finding confirms a reduction in the bank’s monitoring effort 
following an exogenous decrease in the value of the collateral. 
In sum, the intensity and frequency of the bank’s monitoring of the condition of the 
collateral and borrower is reduced as the value of the company mortgage drops. This 
                                                 
15 To the extent that the amortization schedule of our loan contracts is pre-determined, the decrease in 
loan exposure over time is mechanical. Moreover, we do not observe changes in amortization plans for 
the group of loans used in our analysis. Therefore the differential effects we obtain for the collateral 
coverage ratio cannot be attributed to differential changes in loan exposure across the two groups. 20 
 
result suggests that a part of a bank’s monitoring activities may be collateral-related and 
that collateral posting not necessarily makes a bank “lazy.” 
6.  Conclusion 
Collateral  is  an  important  feature  of  many  debt  contracts  and  a  feature  that  has 
received much attention in  the  academic  literature. However, the intricate nature of 
collateral such as its joint determination with other contract terms and its impact on 
borrower  and  bank  behavior  imposes  steep  empirical  identification  challenges. 
Moreover, accurate data on collateral values, for example, that would enable researchers 
to start to address these challenges is typically not available. 
Our empirical strategy combines two key ingredients that enable us to make progress 
in empirically assessing the value of collateral. First, we study the impact of a sudden 
change in a law in Sweden that exogenously reduced the value of company mortgages. 
The company mortgage is a commonly used means of collateral to secure credit in 
Sweden, which is similar to the floating lien in the US, the floating charge in the UK, 
and the chattel mortgage in Australia. The change in the Law on Company Mortgages 
was implemented on January 1
st, 2004. Second, we have access to a comprehensive 
dataset from a major Swedish bank that contains detailed information about the loan 
contracts, including the regularly updated estimates of the value of the assets pledged to 
secure each loan. 
We study the impact of the change in the law on the bank’s business loan portfolio 
using a differences-in-differences approach. Following the change in the law, we find 
that the bank reduces the assessed value of collateral and contemporaneously increases 
the interest rate. The bank lowers its internal credit limit to the borrower, and formally 
downgrades  the  borrower.  However,  the  intensity  and  frequency  of  the  bank’s 
monitoring of the condition of the collateral and borrower is significantly reduced. 21 
 
Our results indicate that collateral is valuable for the borrower and important for the 
bank. While pledging high-quality collateral enables borrowers to pay lower loan rates 
and  benefit  from  increased  credit  availability,  our  results  also  suggest  that  lenders 
preserve their incentives to monitor the borrower. As a result, collateral enhances the 






Table 1 – Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
The table defines the variables used in the analysis and displays the summary statistics, i.e., the mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.) and number of observations (Obs.). 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
Loan contract         
Collateral value (€000)  Estimated value of assets pledged to secure the loan  49.95  184.15  108,368 
Coverage ratio (%)  Collateral value / Loan exposure  46.60  46.54  108,368 
Loan rate (%)  Annual interest rate of the loan  6.57  1.51  108,368 
Borrower         
Internal rating  Internal rating assigned by the bank to the borrower (0-20)  9.29  3.23  56,696 
Internal limit (€000)  Maximum exposure towards the borrower  499.09  2616.09  99,635 
Monitoring intensity of collateral         
Change in collateral value (%)  Annualized absolute value of the monthly change in collateral value  6.05  19.83  107,372 
Change in coverage ratio (%)  Annualized absolute value of the monthly change in coverage ratio  2.90  13.02  107,372 
Monitoring frequency of collateral         
Nr. changes in collateral value  Number of yearly changes in collateral value  2.02  3.04  108,368 
Nr. changes in coverage ratio  Number of yearly changes in coverage ratio  2.35  3.97  108,368 
Monitoring of borrower         
Time to next review (months)  Number of months to next review of the borrower’s situation  10.42  3.20  94,704 
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Table 2 – Change in law and credit terms: Comparison of means 
For each dependent variable, the table displays the averages for the non-treated and treated loans and for 
borrowers before and after the change in company mortgage law on January 1
st, 2004. Non-treated refers 
to borrowers that never registered a company mortgage in the period 2000-2006. Treated indicates that 
the borrower had a company mortgage outstanding on January 1
st, 2004. After refers to the period 2004-
2006 and Before refers to the year 2003. Standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in 
parentheses.  The  symbols  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate  significance  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%  levels, 
respectively. 
  Before  After  Difference 
Ln(1 + Collateral value)       
Non-treated loans  5.96  5.52  -0.44*** 
  (5.25)  (5.25)   
Treated loans  6.29  5.05  -1.24*** 
  (4.95)  (4.94)   
Difference  0.33  -0.47  -0.80** 
Coverage ratio (%)          
Non-treated loans  48.34  45.71  -2.63*** 
  (46.2)  (46.7)   
Treated loans  51.22  43.99  -7.23** 
  (45.17)  (46.78)   
Difference  2.88  -1.72  -4.61 
Interest rate (%)          
Non-treated loans  6.94  6.35  -0.59*** 
  (1.35)  (1.58)   
Treated loans  7.04  6.79  -0.25*** 
  (0.97)  (1.06)   
Difference  0.10  0.44***  0.34*** 
Ln(1 + Internal limit)          
Non-treated borrowers  11.74  11.71  -0.03 
  (1.51)  (1.55)   
Treated borrowers  11.73  11.45  -0.28*** 
  (1.19)  (1.4)   
Difference  -0.01  -0.26**  -0.25*** 
Internal Rating          
Non-treated borrowers  9.67  9.41  -0.26*** 
  (2.71)  (3.15)   
Treated borrowers  7.08  6.08  -1.00** 
  (4.14)  (4.58)   
Difference  -2.59***  -3.33***  -0.73 24 
 
Table 3 – Change in law and credit terms: Panel analysis 
The table reports the results for regressions of the form:                                      
    where i indexes loans or borrowers, t indexes year*month, and   is the 
differences-in-differences estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term of Treated and After. The dependent variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics (standard 
errors are clustered at the borrower level) are provided in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable 
Loan    Borrower 
Ln(Collateral)  Coverage ratio  Loan rate    Ln(Internal limit)  Internal rating 
Treated x After  -0.75***  -4.15***  0.24***    -0.13***  -1.84*** 
  (-11.39)  (-6.73)  (18.37)    (-12.12)  (-32.28) 
Loan fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes    No  No 
Borrower fixed effects  No  No  No    Yes  Yes 
Year*month fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.03  0.01  0.25    0.06  0.05 
Number of loans  3,537  3,537  3,537    3,515  2,155 
Number of observations  108,368  108,368  108,368    99,635  56,696 25 
 
Table  4  –  Change  in  law  and  loan  rate  controlling  for  borrower  risk:  Panel 
analysis 
The table reports the results for regressions of the form:                                      
    where i 
indexes loans or borrowers, t indexes year*month, and   is the differences-in-differences estimate of the 
coefficient on the interaction term of Treated and After. The dependent variables are defined in Table 1. 
Robust t-statistics (standard errors are clustered at the borrower level) are provided in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable  Loan rate 
Borrower Risk  Ln(Internal limit)    Internal rating 
Independent Variables  (I)  (II)    (I)  (II) 
Treated×After  0.19***  0.18***    0.39***  0.33*** 
  (12.42)  (11.68)    (20.76)  (17.66) 
Borrower Risk    -0.09***      -0.03*** 
    (-19.26)      (-21.87) 
Loan fixed effects  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Year*month fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
R-squared (%)  0.24  0.24    0.33  0.34 
Number of loans  3,491  3,491    2,083  2,083 
Number of observations  99,635  99,635    56,696  56,696 
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Table 5 – Change in law and monitoring: Comparison of means 
For each dependent variable, the table displays the averages for the non-treated and treated borrowers 
before  and  after  the  change  in  company  mortgage  law  on  January  1
st,  2004.  Non-treated  refers  to 
borrowers that never registered a company mortgage in the period 2000-2006. Treated indicates that the 
borrower had a company mortgage outstanding on January 1
st, 2004. After refers to the period 2004-2006 
and  Before  refers  to  the  year  2003.  Standard  errors  (clustered  at  the  firm  level)  are  provided  in 
parentheses.  The  symbols  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate  significance  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%  levels, 
respectively. 
  Before  After  Difference 
Absolute change in collateral value (%) 
Non-treated borrowers  5.58  5.98  0.40* 
  (18.81)  (19.79)   
Treated borrowers  9.90  8.50  -1.40 
  (25.39)  (23.73)   
Difference  4.32***  2.52***  -1.80 
Absolute change in collateral coverage (%) 
Non-treated borrowers  2.65  2.87  0.22* 
  (11.68)  (13.31)   
Treated borrowers  4.79  4.28  -0.51 
  (15.31)  (16.22)   
Difference  2.14***  1.41***  -0.73 
Number of changes in collateral value 
Non-treated borrowers  2.02  1.98  -0.04 
  (3.05)  (3.03)   
Treated borrowers  2.68  2.27  -0.41 
  (3.10)  (3.15)   
Difference  0.66***  0.29  -0.37 
Number of changes in collateral coverage 
Non-treated borrowers  2.52  2.25  -0.27*** 
  (4.09)  (3.92)   
Treated borrowers  3.09  2.15  -0.94*** 
  (4.10)  (3.58)   
Difference  0.57**  -0.10  -0.67** 
Time to next review 
Non-treated borrowers  11.05  10.22  -0.83*** 
  (2.71)  (3.30)   
Treated borrowers  9.26  9.61  0.35 
  (4.03)  (3.61)   
Difference  -1.79***  -0.61***  1.18*** 27 
 
Table 6 – Change in law and monitoring: Panel analysis 
The table reports the results for regressions of the form:                                      
    where i indexes loans or borrowers, t indexes year*months, and   is the 
differences-in-differences estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term of Treated and After. The dependent variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics (standard 
errors are clustered at the borrower level) are provided in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Monitoring of collateral    Monitoring of borrower 
  Change in value    Number of changes   
Time to next review 
 Dependent variable   Ln(Collateral)  Coverage ratio    Ln(Collateral)  Coverage ratio   
Treated x After  -2.52***  -1.22***    -0.64***  -0.84***    0.62*** 
  (-5.04)  (-3.50)    (-13.75)  (-15.14)    (6.48) 
Loan fixed effects  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    No 
Borrower fixed effects  No  No    No  No    Yes 
Year*month fixed effects  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes 
R-squared  0.001  0.001    0.01  0.04    0.08 
Number of loans  3,537  3,537    3,537  3,537    3,406 
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